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This map shows the various districts assigned to foreign military and
naval forces for the defense of Shanghai, as arranged by agreement among
th_e f<;>reign commanders on January 27, 1932, previous to the recent conflict.
District (A) was assigned to the Japanese; (B) to the Volunteer Force of
the International Settlement; (C) to the Americans; (D) to the British; and
(E) to the French.

BACKGROUND OF THE SHANGHAI TROUBLE
The International Settlement

T

HE International Settlement of Shanghai is a plot of
marshy ground 8 2/3 square miles in extent, or one~
third the size of Manhattan, which has grown into a for~
eign settlement out of British and American land conces~
sions obtained from the Chinese in the '40's. It is
immune from Chinese control.
Its ascent from a mudflat to a commercial metropolis
fourth or fifth among world ports has been accompanied
by the development of a near~independence. Quite early
the foreign residents established a Municipal Council,
which, in the course of time, has become an administra~
tive organ with very ramified powers. At present it is
composed of six Britishers, five Chinese, one American
and two Japanese. An American is director~general, a
post equivalent to that of Mayor, or city manager, in the
United States.
The Council, strangely enough, has no courts to inter~
pret its own regulations or to punish infractions of them.
The 2 7, 000 foreign residents are responsible, not to the
Municipal Council, not to the Chinese, but to tlieir own
consuls, who maintain a system of consular courts in
Shanghai. This is not peculiar to Shanghai. Foreigners
throughout China 'a re withdrawn from Chinese jurisdic~
tion in virtue of the system known as extraterritoriality.
In Shanghai this system qualifies a status for the Settle~
ment that would otherwise be that of a free city or a
minature republic under the powers' protection.
There are nearly a million Chinese within this tiny
ghetto. In the last few years they have been responsib1e
to their own courts.
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In addition to a local volunteer force, under the
Municipal Council, foreign governments, in protection
of their nationals, if not of the Settlement itself, station
troops in Shanghai. Soldiers and m a rines are coming
and going all the time.
China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy"
The presence of foreign troops in Shanghai would not
be necessary if there were no danger of trouble from the
Chinese. Such danger, however, exists, and it keeps the
troops ever on the alert. It arises from the stated policy
of the Chinese Nationalist government to effect the resto~
ration of the Settlement to Chinese control.
The policy is in the nature of a campaign sometimes
called "revolutionary diplomacy," sometimes "rights~
recovery.
To foreign correspondents in Peking in
December, 1929, Foreign Minister C. T . Wang outlined
its chronology as follows: 1930, abolition of extraterri~
toriality; I 9 3 I , recovery of foreign concessions and set~
tlements; 1933, recovery of leased territories, etc.
There has never been any disguise of the manner in
which these privileges were to be regained. Preferably
the Chinese want them returned on the dates set by them~
selves by diplomatic negotiations. But "revolutionary
diplomacy" does not stop at n egotiations. It aims at the
achievement of its object regardless of means. If diplo~
matic negotiations do not progress satisfactorily to the
Chinese, unilateral denunciation of treaties is regarded as
the second weapon of attack. This weapon has already
been employed against a t least a dozen powers. Force,
direct or indirect, is the final w eapon, and this, too, has
been used frequently-in the early days of the Nationalist
movement, when it was directed by Soviet Russians,
without trying any other method.
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The use of force against foreign land concessions dates
from January 3, I 9 2 7. Nationalist mobs invaded the
British concession at Hankow, the premier port other
than Shanghai on the Yangtze river, and turned out the
British authority. The theft was subsequently ratified by
an agreement with the British dated February 19.
China's success at Hankow encouraged further forceful
experiments. All eyes were turned on Shanghai. To the
Settlement, in consequence of the fact that it is an oasis
in a howling desert of Chinese misrule, has gravitated for
safekeeping much of the surplus wealth of the Chinese
people. Even the Treasury reserve of the Nanking government is now held there. Hoards of such fabulous
dimensions, added to the wealth of a great city in its own
right, have never ceased to beckon China's civil warriors.
What a city to sack I The Nationalists, over the heads of
their Soviet Russian advisers, who wished to push on to
Peking, decided to sidetrack the Revolution from Hankow
to Shanghai. On the heels of the successful assault on
the Hankow concession, they came swarming down the
Yangtze river.
This time the British took alarm.
Most of their
$1,500,000,000 of investments in China, are located at
Shanghai. So they dispatched an expeditionary force to
defend the Settlement from the expected incursion. With
the cooperation of other powers, including the United
States and Japan, the zone was saved by the presence
of an allied force numbering 25,000. It is ~he testimony
of all observers that but for the Allied forces it would
assuredly have shared the fate of Hankow. This experience, together with the "revolutionary diplomacy" of the
Nationalist government, will account for the military
activity which has never since been absent from Shanghai.
In 1 9 2 7 the British took the lead in these defensive
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measures. For they had been, and were at the time, the
target of Nationalist odium. There was no let-up in the
agitation even as a result of the British government's
resignation of the Hankow concession. The British continued to be "arch-imperialists" and all Chinese who had
anything to do with them their "running dogs." Contemporary accounts afford vivid proof of the manner in
which, from Canton to Peking (Peiping), their rights
were trampled upon and their persons assailed.
Neutralization Proposals in Shanghai
In Shanghai the stand that the British decided to make
was dictated by the feeling that unless they did so · not
only would the Settlement be overrun but they would be
driven out of China by force. But in the Settlement they
were on a pinpoint of land, a third the size of Manhattan.
From a military standpoint the defense of the zone would
have been no defense at all unless carried beyond its
legal boundaries. So the British went outside in order to
establish a neutral zone.
Moreover, they disarmed
Chinese troops in that extra-Settlement area.
The neutralization of a greater Shanghai has, in fact,
been bruited for many years. Strange as it may sound,
it has even had Chinese adherence. When the Communist-Nationalist mob came surging down the Yangtze
river to take Shanghai, C. T. Wang, who later became
Nationalist Foreign Minister, urged neutralization of an
extensive zone surrounding Shanghai. He was then on
the other side from the Nationalists.
Mr. Wang's effort had two results. One was the proposal of Secretary Kellogg, dated February 5, 1 9 2 7, for
the neutralization of the Settlement. As the Settlement
is neutralized as a matter of course, no power took up
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the suggestion. The next result was the creation by force
of a neutral zone by the defensive forces in 1 9 2 7.
In Tientsin, the largest port in North China, there is
a precedent for the neutralization of outer Shanghai.
After the Boxer outrages in 1900, the Chinese were com·
pelled to sign an undertaking to neutralize access to the
sea, all the way from Peking (Peiping) to Tientsin and
on to Shanhaikwan.
The Japanese cooperated in the 1 9 2 7 defensive meas·
ures at Shanghai. For they were as anxious as the British
that the Settlement should be protected against Nationalist assault. In absolute terms their interests in Shanghai
are perhaps second to Britain's. But they are far more
important to Japan than the investments of other powers
are to them. This is how Professor George H. Blakeslee,
now attached to the State Department, regards them:
"Japanese investments appear in a different class from
those of other countries. They are not a foreign luxury,
but seem to be essential for the maintenance of the present economic status of Japan" (Foreign Affairs, October,
1931 ).
In point of policy toward nationals abroad, however,
the protection of lives takes precedence over the protection of their property. In this respect the Japanese
interest is unique. The total Japanese colony in the
Settlement and its environs is 26,000. This happens to
be only a few hundred short of the total foreign population of the Settlement. Few non-Japanese foreigners
live outside the Settlement limits in Chinese territory.
But, as these figures show, a great percentage of the
Japanese popula tion do; and this affords an edge to the
Japanese desire for a neutral zone, and in the direction
that the Japanese have taken up their residence.
The whole of the Chinese territory outside of the

(7)

Settlement which we have called Shanghai's environs
bears the generic name of Greater Shanghai. It is split
up into various areas, all under Chinese jurisdiction.
Feeding upon the Settlement, and the foreign trade and
industry that it attracts, these areas have developed cheek
by jowl with it, and hold another two million Chinese.
One of them is Chapei, where the people are tightly
packed in narrow streets, and where the Japanese number
6,000. Chapei is situated next to the portion of the
Settlement called Hongkew which has come to be
referred to as "the Japanese section" because of the preponderance of Japanese among the foreign residents.
In Greater Shanghai are congregated the most articulate
among China's population. Either in Chinese territory
or in the Settlement, communists, students, professional
agitators and other disorderly elements maintain their
headquarters.·

The Boycott as a Weapon
The Japanese have been through similar ordeals as
the British went through in 192 7. Soon it was their turn
to succeed them as the goat for the hoodlums. In May,
1928 the Japanese sent some troops into the province of
Shantung solely to protect their nationals during an
upheaval. When the danger was over, they were withdrawn, and would have been withdrawn earlier but for
the appeal of Chiang Kai-shek, then President of the
Nationalist government and still its de facto head, that
they should delay evacuation until he had obtained complete control of the province:
In spite of Chiang's
request, however, Japan became the victim of a boycott
movement (the seventh she ha·d had to endure in China),
which is a form of the third weapon, the weapon of force,
of China's "revolutionary diplomacy."
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There is a great deal of misunderstanding of the
Chinese boycott in the United States. This is rather surprising, as the United States was the first victim of it.
An anti-American boycott occurred in 1905 by way of
protest against American exclusion of Chinese immigration in the United States. United States Minister Rockhill,
who landed in China while it was in full swing, defined
it as "a conspiracy in restraint of our trade carried on
under official guidance and with the sympathy of the central government." (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U. S. , 1905, p. 218.) Acting on his definition, he insisted p eremptorily that the government should
call it off. In a note transmitted at the request of Secretary Elihu Root, he said:
"My government is emphatically of the opm10n that it has
been and still is the duty of the Imperial government completely to put a stop to this movement which is carried on in
open violation of solemn treaty provisions and of the laws of
China and is an unwarranted attempt of the ignorant people to
assume the functions of government and to meddle with international relations." (p. 223.)

At the same time he asked for the support of other
powers in putting down the movement with rigorous
severity in areas in which they had influence. An appeal
was made to the ]apa~ese at the Manchurian port of
Newchwang. People whispered that the Japanese, far
from helping the Americans, were covertly encouraging
the boycott. Minister Rockhill felt called upon to give
the lie to these calumnies. He reported to Secretary
Root:
"I beg that the Department will not attach importance to
the statements being made in the ports and in the United States
press that the Japanese government has had anything to do
with encouraging the present anti-American movement. The
conduct of the Japanese government has been not only friendly
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throughout, but their foreign office has done all in its power to
arrest the movement and control the Japanese controlled papers
published in China." (p. 213.)

With this cooperation, and with the requisite Chinese
official action, the movement eventually came to an end.

What Japan Objects To
This precedent, together with Minister Rockhill's definition, should be kept firmly in mind in approaching the
Japanese reaction to the Chinese boycott. Japan does
not object to the spontaneous refusal of individuals to
buy Japanese goods. It is farcical to think that the
Japanese could be so ridiculous. Japan, like every other
trading nation, is zealous in soliciting Chinese patronage
for her products. She can go no further than that.
What Japan objects to is the following:
( I ) The establishment of boycott association clothed
indirectly or directly with extra-legal power.
(2) Scurrillous anti-Japanese propaganda in the press,
virulent anti-Japanese posters, compulsory nonbuying and non-selling, lynching of "traitor"
merchants who do business with the Japanese,
compulsory strikes in Japanese factories in China,
assaults upon, and insults to, Japanese merchants,
burning of Japanese goods and confiscation of
Japanese goods.
The acts under ( 2) are all inspired and organized by
the boycott associations. They are the work of professional hoodlums, who are protected by or who protect {according to the point of view) the Nanking
government.
There is no need to stress the utter dislocation of
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Chinese government. It was borne out in every newspaper dispatch from China prior to the Manchurian affair
of September 18 last year. If the facts were not registered in Western consciousness at the time, they were
hammered into the consciousness of Japan, which, it is
well to reiterate, is located next door to China and its
chaos. The Nanking government's weakness is disguised
from the world because it derives strength from its recognition by the powers as the government of China.
Therein also lies its only appeal to the malcontents.
When foreign affairs become pressing, they climb on
board the ship of state, as they did in October, when they
overran the ministries and beat Foreign Minister C. T.
Wang almost to death. Otherwise, disregarding the government, which is futile at home, they enforce as government action the illegal acts of their own boycott associations. In Minister Rockhill's words, they "assume the
functions of government."
The Provocation of the Boycott
Since 19 2 7 the Chinese government has officially
adhered to the boycott as a means for achieving its diplomatic ends. This was not the case in 1905. As one
of the organs of the Nationalist Party, it derives all its
authority from that organization. And the party constitution is the embodiment of the "Three People's principles" advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, so-called father
of the Nationalist Revolution. Dr. Sun urged his followers to resort to anti-foreignism and economic boycott
in order to accomplish his principles, in particular "the
principle of Nationalism." Consequently the boycott and
anti-foreign movement generally have been recognized
officially by the party and through the party by the
government.
(11)

It is not necessary to produce japanese evidence of
the provocation endured by the japanese in the 1928
boycott. The London Times of june 1, 1929 provides it.
The boycott was still raging. In the course of a twocolumn a rticle on conditions in China, this British newspaper, which has a universal reputation for accuracy, first
explains that the powers of the Tang Pu (branch councils
of the Nationalist party) are absolute in China. Then it
says that in Shanghai the Anti-japanese Boycott Society
"had the local branch of the Kuomintang (Nationalist
party) in their pocket." In other words, if the Tang Pu
had extra-legal powers, the Boycott Society must have
had super extra-legal powers. These they were demonstrating at the time the article was written.
"They seized wha tever rooms they wanted in the Chamber of
Commerce f or t heir offices ; radical meetings of all sorts were
held in its assembly Hall; and when the Chamber tried to protest, it was told to take its choice-to put up with things or be
put out of its premises."

Suppose a group of students from Columbia University
decided to boycott goods made in Spain. Suppose they
occupied the premises of the New York Chamber of
Commerce.
That is the equivalent situation to that
which existed in Shanghai in 1929. It is because of its
ridiculousness that people in the West find it so hard to
appreciate what the boycott really means in China.
But let us go back to the impartial report of the London

Times:
"The gates of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce
are tightly barricaded. All the work of the Chamber is suspended, and its rooms resound to the tread of armed guards.
So they will remain until -such time as Nanking can make up
its mind whether it will suppor t the real pillars of Chinese busi. ness or the agitator and the political rowdy. It is a grave situation. On the one side is organized business, capital, the best
brains in the country, the men who are most honest in their
desire to bring reform and progress to China; on the other are
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the wastrels and freebooters of the Anti-Japanese Boycott
Society (now politely called the National Salvation Society)
and a host of mushroom organizations grouped together in the
so-called Union of Merchants and Citizens of Greater Shanghai,
professing to represent the Chinese middle and lower class merchant, but in truth representing nobody but themselves. The
union, which hates the chamber for its prestige and wealth, and
the boycotters, who hate the chamber because it has dared to
assert that with settlement of the Tsinan (Shantung) affair the
Japanese boycott ought to cease, have made the chamber's life
a misery. And they have been steadily backed up by the
Shanghai Tang-Pu, which has always been among the "reddest"
of the district councils."

Japan's Diplomacy
Grievous as was their provocation, the japanese in
1928 and 1929 did nothing. In pursuance of an attitude
of patient conciliation dating from the end of the Washington Conference in 1922, they waited until the affair
had blown over. It came to an end, as these things do,
when a diversion occurred. China got embroiled with
Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and, like a flock of locusts, the "wastrels and
freebooters'' moved to other pastures, where they vented
their professional patriotism. The Japanese resumed
business.
But abroad the Japanese tried to do something. They
tried to persuade the world, which, in the meantime, had
come to accept the Kellogg-Briand Pact banning war as
an instrument of national policy, that war might be
invisible as well as visible. They had in mind this kind
of organized boycott, this "conspiracy," as Minister
Rockhill called it. At the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations they put forth the thesis that the
boycott was being used
(a) as an instrument of national policy.
(b) as a warlike act.
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Therefore, contended the Japanese, it should be outlawed along with the kind of war that the world knew as
war. Mr. Masunosuke Odagiri, director of the Y okohama Specie Bank, in a paper at the Kyoto conference
said:

"It would seem that the continued application of the boycott
as an instrument to settle international disputes is not only
highly provocative and unjust in the light of accepted principles
of international intercourse between friendly peoples, but, if war
is to be condemned as an instrument of national policy, so also
must the boycott be outlawed."
Perhaps the most important result of the overture was
the contribution of Professor James T. Shotwell, of
Columbia University, one of the unofficial fathers of the
Kellogg Pact. In the course of his remarks, he said: "I
can say quite frankly here that the Pact of Paris fails
signally to answer the question of what is war and what is
peaceful settlement." Possibly this pregnant sentence
was not in response to Mr. Odagiri. It may have been
inspired by the visit to China that Mr. Shotwell undertook
before he arrived in Japan. At any rate, he asked a
question for which Minister Rockhill had already provided and the Japanese were trying to provide the
answer.
Beyond this statement little came of the Japanese
friendly, diplomatic and peaceful effort. Things went
from bad to worse in China. Viewed again relatively,
they appeared much worse to Japan, a next-door neighbor to them, than to the nations of the West. Then the
world depression arrived, and hit Japan, which had just
climbed painfully and laboriously back to the gold
standard after the terrible setback of the Japanese earthquake of 1923, perhaps worse than other nations. A
boycott this time could not be regarded with the same
equanimity as it had been in the past down to 1929.
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Chinese Government and the Boycott
But such a movement did develop in China - the
eighth. And it developed with a ferocity without parallel
in the turbulent history of Chinese boycotts. Little was
heard about it in the West, because a boycott, being
scattered, underground and non-spectacular, is not very
interesting news, unless it develops into mass collisions.
Lack of information explains why the majority of people
imagine that the present boycott came as the result of
the Manchurian affair of September 18, when Chinese
and Japanese troops clashed. This is wrong. It came
months before as the result of a petty row over a ground
lease which took place between Chinese and Koreans at
a north Manchurian village in the summer of 19 31 . The
trouble spread into anti-Chinese demonstrations in Korea,
which the Japanese eventually put down with a firm
hand, and an anti-Japanese boycott in China, which the
Chinese government supported.
The evidence of official support on this occasion is
very clear. As usual, Shanghai was the radiating center.
It directed the Nanking government. Instruction No. 444,
issued by the Government Department of Railways,
dated August 7, six weeks prior to the Manchurian affair
of September 18, says quite frankly that the Department
had received the following telegram under date of
July 31 from the joint committee of the various antiJapanese associations at Shangllai:
"Taking advantage of the Wanpaoshan incident, the Japane!e
have started a violent anti-Chinese movement by instigating
Koreans by whom our nationals in Korea were massacred in
large numbers and have been otherwise placed under unspeakable atrocities. At this critical moment in this nation, the
entire people should unite in their common protest against
Japan and carry out an economic disruption against her at all
cost. Such an economic disruption, however, is only a temporary measure and is sufficient neither for the promotion of
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Chinese industries nor to check the importation of Japanese
goods. Special transportation facility should be extended to
domestic coal and other raw materials inasmuch as upon them
depends the development of the nation's industrial life1 so as to
enable the reduction of their cost. Complete check of tne importation of Japanese coal and other raw materials into China
may not be possible in a day, but efforts may profitably be
made for the reduction of the amount of their importation; such
a policy will certainly prove a permanent measure. We hereby
request, acting under the resolution passed by the fifth executive
committee of the anti-Japanese association, that your Department will be good enough to adopt this petition."

Then the Department goes on to say:
"The foregoing petition has as its object the restriction of
the importation of Japanese coal for which your co-operation is
asked. You are ordered to extend every facility to the transportation of domestic coal. You should see to it that the sufficient
number of freight carriages is provided for the speedy transportation of this important raw material."

Imagine the Interstate Commerce Commission circulating such an order as this at the behest of the Columbia
students. It is a topsy-turvy world that we have to deal
with.
Spa1:e forbids the enumeration of more illustrations.
They are numerous. And they can be found in a collection compiled by the League of Nations Association of
Japan, 12, Nichome, Marunouchi, Tokyo. It is apparent
from a reading of this collection that orders began to
pour out of the Nationalist government offices invoking
the boycott in deference to orders from the Shanghai
associations.
Came the Manchurian affair of September 18. Since
this sketch is dealing specifically with the background of
the trouble at Shanghai, we will not outline the Japanese
case here, but as a sidelight on the provocations that the
Japanese have endured for years past, provocations
which led directly to the Shanghai as well as the Manchurian situation, we might pause to give the testimony
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of non-Japanese on the spot. This should insure impartiality and neutrality. It should also insure what is so
important to the Japanese at this juncture, namely, knowledgeability.
The testimony comes from the Tientsin
British Committee of Information, a body composed of
British business men, and it takes the form of a letter to
the Peking and Tientsin Times, a British-owned newspaper,
dated October 24. The letter is signed for the Committee by its chairman, Mr. P . H. B. Kent. Inter alia,
the Committee says:
"The fact is that the Chinese, by a policy of utter irresponsibility and all-round aggravation, brought this upon themselves.
They literally goaded the Japanese into action. Braggadocio
and arrogance on the one hand were united with prolonged
dodging of responsibility on the other."

Japan's Decision to Act
We come now to the place from which, in times of
foreign crisis, the Nanking government takes its orders,
namely, Shanghai. Aware that they could get nowhere
in their presentation of the boycott as a violation of the
Kellogg Pact, harassed by their economic difficulties, the
Japanese decided to take unilateral action.
Boycott
troubles were increasing in intensity. It is difficult to
conceive of these incidents occurring in another country
as important to any other major power as China is to
Japan without that power acting similarly. In fact, as
we have seen, Japan had plenty of precedent even in
China itself.
Incident piled on incident to warrant the Japanese
decision. On January 9 a Shanghai Chinese paper called
the Republican Daily News published an article insulting
the honor of the Japanese Imperial House. The throne
occupies a position in Japan that is probably unique
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among modern peoples. Imagine, therefore, the feeling
that these aspersions created in Japanese breasts. Nine
days later, on January 18, a party of Japanese priests, on
their way to service, were attacked. One was killed and
three were severely wounded.
There is an exact parallel for this latter outrage. On
June 21, 1870, a mixed mob of rowdies and soldiers
brutaUy murdered the priests and sisters of the Roman
Catholic Cathedral in Tientsin, which was under French
protection. The Chinese were made to pay dearly for
their misbehavior. A large indemnity was exacted, the
prefect and magistrate were banished, and the then superitendent of Trade was sent to France with a letter of
apology from the Emperor.
Local passions in Shanghai began to run higher after
the attack on the Japanese priests. The Japanese proceeded to act with the preemptoriness of Minister Rockhill. On January 21 the Consul General presented to
the Mayor of Greater Shanghai four demands the central
feature of which called for the dissolution of those pernicious extra-1egal anti-Japanese societies run, according
to the London Times, by "wastrels and freebooters."
Nothing was done for a week. But there was nothing
static about the ferment. Feeling mounted to such a
tension point that the Municipal Council, declaring that
a state of emergency existed, assigned the defense of the
Settlement to the foreign forces to take effect as from
4 p.m. on January 28. One hour before, 3 p.m., the
Chinese Mayor complied with the Japanese demands.
But, instead of quieting down, things grew far more
threatening, and the forces proceeded according to
schedule to their assigned sectors at the boundaries of the
Settlement. It was while the Japanese marines were
going to their posts in Hongkew, facing the Chinese dis-
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trict of Chapei, that the shots were fired that precipitated
the conflict.
There has been no statement from the Municipal Council as to the nature of the emergency which caused them
to proclaim a state of siege. The only contribution from
neutral s~urces appears in a report submitted by the consular committee hurriedly appointed by the League of
Nations. According to the newspaper summary, this
simply states that it is impossible to establish the origin
of the firing.
Self-Defense, Not War
The japanese are convinced that their account is
accurate. This is that (a) malcontents had made their
way into the Settlement and were demonstrating their
anti-japonism, (b) that immediately on the acceptance
of the Japanese demands the Chinese police vanished
from the streets of Chapei, (c) that the hoodlums were
sharing control with the semi-mutinous Nineteenth Route
Army.
The japanese version has never been denied. And
there is circumstantial ~vidence that it is correct. We
have seen in what manner the hoodlums controlled
the Nanking government. If they controlled the government, they surely controlled a local Mayor. It stands to
reason that hoodlumism of this order would not brook
of any peace-making.
Back of the hoodlums were the Nineteenth Route
Army, a Cantonese force which, when the Cantonese
faction, defeated in its project of declaring war on Japan,
was ejected from the Nanking government in January,
came streaming down to Shanghai. They were ripe for
any mischief.
Already the melee had started in the afternoon of
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January 28. Should the Japanese have stayed on their
sector and suffered their fellow-countrymen across the
way to be slaughtered~ This is asking a good deal of
flesh and blood. There were 6,000 Japanese in Chapei,
at the mercy of these anti-Japanese elements. Only an
imaginary line divided the mar~nes from going to their
rescue. The marines, like the ~ritish in 192 7, went over
that line.
That there can have been no preconceived plan of
military operations is apparent from these facts:
{a) The Shanghai area is a quagmire.
the local farmers are boats.

The "carts" of

{b) The Japanese, with their vast interests, have a
stake in the preservation of peace in the Settlement and its vinicity.
{c) The Japanese were immensely outnumbered.
(d) The Japanese marines had to contend, back and
front, with the pest of military men, the plainclothes fighter, who had got into the International
Settlement in large numbers, and who infested
the narrow streets of Chapei. There is a simple
rule in every army for dealing with him, treatment which, incidentally, may explain the atrocity
stories.
Hence the Japanese contend that their action in
Shanghai is self-defensive.
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